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Abstract
We propose a new type of values for cooperative TU-games, which we call pyramidal values.
Assuming that the grand coalition is sequentially formed, and all orderings are equally likely,
we define a pyramidal value to be any expected payoff in which the entrant player receives a
salary and the right to get part of the benefits derived from subsequent incorporations to the just
formed coalition, whereas the remaining benefit is distributed among the incumbent players. To
be specific, we consider some parametric families of pyramidal values: the egalitarian pyramidal
family, which coincides with the α-consensus value family introduced by Ju et al. (2007), the
proportional pyramidal family, and the weighted pyramidal family, which in turn includes the other
two families as special cases. We also analyze the properties of these families, as well as their
relationships with other previously defined values.
Keywords: Game theory, TU games, pyramidal values, consensus values
1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a general procedure for obtaining a broad class of solution concepts
based on a pyramidal distribution of the benefits that are sequentially obtained through a dy-
namic process of coalition formation, in which players successively come into play and join the
current coalition until the gran coalition is formed. The well-known Shapley value (Shapley,
1953) has been characterized (Weber, 1988) as the average over all permutations of a very extreme
pyramidal distribution of the benefits, in which the entrant player receives all the just generated
benefits (jointly created by the existing coalition of players and the entrant), when the grand coali-
tion is sequentially formed, and all orderings are equally likely. However, such extreme shares
immediately lead us to point out two questions: Why the incumbents are going to accept the deal?
Why the entrant is going to stay in the coalition after receiving all his contribution?
Assuming also that all orderings are equally likely, we propose a class of values based on a
more general pyramidal sharing scheme in which the entrant player receives a salary and the right
1This research has been supported by I+D+i research project MTM2011-27892 from the Government of Spain.
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to get part of the benefits derived from subsequent incorporations to the just formed coalition,
whereas the remaining benefit is distributed among the incumbent players. In Section 2, we first
introduce some standard concepts and notation on Game Theory that will be used throughout this
paper, we provide a formal definition of a pyramidal value, and we analyze some general properties
of that class of values. In Sections 3 and 4, we define parametric families of pyramidal values in
which the entrant player receives as salary his own value plus a fixed proportion of the jointly
created benefit less his salary, whereas the remaining benefit is distributed among the incumbent
players. If the remaining benefit is equally allocated among the incumbents, then we obtain the
family of α-egalitarian pyramidal values. On the contrary, if the remaining surplus is distributed
according to each player’s contribution to the coalition previously formed, we obtain the family of
α-proportional pyramidal values. Finally, if the remaining surplus is distributed according to a given
collection of weighting vectors ω exogenously given, then we obtain the family of α-ω-weighted
pyramidal values, which in fact includes the previous two families. In Section 3 we discuss the
family of α-egalitarian pyramidal values, which in fact turns out to be the family of α-consensus
values introduced by Ju, Borm and Ruys (2007). The other two families are introduced in Section
4, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Pyramidal values
An n-person cooperative game in characteristic function form with transferable utility (TU game)
is an ordered pair (N, v), where N is a finite set of n players and v : P(N)→ IR is a map assigning
a real number v(S), called the value of S, to each coalition S ⊆ N, and where v(∅) = 0. The real
number v(S) represents the reward that coalition S can achieve by itself if all its members act
together. Let Gn be the space of all TU games with fixed player set N, where n = |N|, and identify
(N, v) ∈ Gn with its characteristic function v when no ambiguity appears. One of the main topics
dealt with in Cooperative Game Theory is, given a game (N, v) ∈ Gn, to divide the amount v(N)
between players if the grand coalition N is formed. A payoff vector, or allocation, is any x ∈ Rn,
which gives player i ∈ N a payoff xi. A payoff vector is said to be efficient if ∑i∈N xi = v(N).
A value ϕ for TU games is an assignation which associates to each n-person game (N, v) ∈ Gn
a payoff vector ϕ(N, v) ∈ Rn. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is one of the most interesting
values in Cooperative Game Theory. It can be characterized as the average of the marginal con-
tribution vectors over all permutations (Weber, 1988). Formally, let (N, v) ∈ Gn, and let Π(N)
denotes the set of all permutations on the player set N, which we will represent as bijections
pi : N → N. For a permutation pi ∈ Π(N), pi(i) ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} represents agent i’s position in
order pi. Define the set of all predecessors of i in pi to be Ppi(i) = {j ∈ N |pi(j) < pi(i)}, and the
set of all his successors to be Spi(i) = {j ∈ N |pi(j) > pi(i)}. Moreover, the direct successor of i
in the order pi will be denoted by dspi(i), and the direct predecessor by dppi(i). Now, the marginal
contribution vector mpi(v) ∈ Rn of game v and permutation pi is given by
mpii (v) = v(Ppi(i) ∪ {i})− v(Ppi(i)), i ∈ N,
which assigns to each player i ∈ N its marginal contribution to the worth of the coalition consist-
2
ing of all his predecessors in pi. In that case, when player j joins coalition Pj(pi), he generates the
surplus mpij (v), which, according to the Shapley value, is distributed among the current coalition
as follows:
• Entrant j’s salary: spij (v) = mpij (v)
• Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: apiij (v) = 0, for all i ∈ Ppi(j)
In this setting, we define a class of values, which we call pyramidal class, that is based on a more
general sharing scheme in which the entrant player receives a salary and the right to get part
of the benefits derived from subsequent incorporations to the just formed coalition, whereas the
remaining benefit is distributed among the incumbent players. Formally:
Definition 1. Let P be a value for TU games. Then, P is called a pyramidal value, if for all n ≥ 1,
for all order pi ∈ Π(N), and for every n-person TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn, there exists a pyramidal
sharing scheme S = {(spij (v))j∈N , {(apiij (v))i∈Ppi(j) | j ∈ N}} such that
spij (v) + ∑
i∈Ppi(j)
apiij (v) = m
pi
j (v), ∀ j ∈ N. (1)
and verifying:
Pi(v) = ∑
pi∈Π(N)
1
n!
ppii (v), ∀ i ∈ N, (2)
where ppii (v) = s
pi
i (v) if pi(i) = n, and
ppii (v) = s
pi
i (v) + ∑
j∈Spi(i)
apiij (v), for all i ∈ N with pi(i) < n. (3)
In the sequel, we will refer to a pyramidal sharing scheme S verifying condition (1) as a P-
efficient sharing scheme. Note that negative salaries or shares are allowed in the previous defi-
nition. As usual, negative quantities must be interpreted as costs, penalties or investments in a
broad sense.
The properties of the sharing scheme determine the pyramidal value properties. Then, let us
formalize some interesting properties of a pyramidal sharing scheme.
Definition 2. Let S = {(spij (v))j∈N , {(apiij (v))i∈Ppi(j) | j ∈ N}} be a P-efficient sharing scheme, and
let (N, v) ∈ Gn be any n-person TU game. Then, S verifies,
(i) Constant Salary. If for all j ∈ N there exists a real constant k j(v) ∈ R such that spij (v) = k j(v),
for all pi ∈ Π(N).
(ii) P-Additivity. If for all order pi ∈ Π(N), and for all j ∈ N it holds spij (v+w) = spij (v)+ spij (w),
and apiij (v + w) = a
pi
ij (v) + a
pi
ij (w), for each j ∈ Spi(i), for all (N, v), (N, w) ∈ Gn, where v + w
is given by (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S), for all S ⊆ N.
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(iii) P-Dummy player. If spii (v) = v(i), and apiij (v) = 0, for all j ∈ Spi(i), and all order pi ∈ Π(N),
for all i ∈ N being a dummy player (i.e., v(S ∪ i) = v(S) + v(i) for every coalition S).
(iv) P-Symmetry. If, for all symmetric players i, j ∈ N (i.e., v(S ∪ i) = v(S ∪ j), for all S ⊆
N \ {i, j}), spii (v) = spij (v), and it follows
apiik(v) = a
piij
jk (v), for all k ∈ Spi(i),
where piij(k) = pi(k), for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, piij(i) = pi(j) and piij(j) = pi(i).
Note that constant salary property implies that the salary is an inherent attribute of each
player. It can be related, for instance, to his personal training. Moreover, since Ppi(i) = ∅ for
all order pi such that pi(i) = 1, then each player’s constant salary equals his own value v(i).
P-Additivity, P-dummy player and P-symmetry trivially lead to the same properties for the cor-
responding pyramidal value. Let us recall those well-known properties of values for TU games.
Formally, a value ϕ : Gn → Rn:
(i) is efficient if ∑i∈N ϕi(v) = v(N), for all (N, v) ∈ Gn;
(ii) is additive if ϕ(v + w) = ϕ(v) + ϕ(w), for all (N, v), (N, w) ∈ Gn;
(iii) is symmetric if ϕi(v) = ϕj(v), for all (N, v) ∈ Gn, and for all symmetric players i, j ∈ N;
(iv) is relative invariant with respect to strategic equivalence if ϕ(N, w) = aϕ(N, v) + b, for every
(N, v) ∈ Gn, a > 0 and b ∈ Rn, where w is given by w(S) = av(S) +∑i∈S bi, for all S ⊆ N.
(v) verifies the dummy property if ϕi(v) = v(i), for all (N, v) ∈ Gn, and for all dummy player
i ∈ N.
(vi) verifies the null player property if ϕi(v) = 0, for all (N, v) ∈ Gn, and for all null player i ∈ N
(i.e., v(S ∪ i) = v(S), for all S ⊆ N \ {i}).
(vii) is standard for two-person games if
ϕi(v) = v(i)+
1
2
(
v({i, j})− v(i)− v(j)), for all i 6= j, for all two-person game ({i, j}, v) ∈ G2.
Proposition 1. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn be a n-person TU game. Then, any efficient allocation ϕ ∈ Rn can be
obtained as a pyramidal payoff.
Proof. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn be a n-person TU game. Since ϕ is efficient, it can be expressed as a
linear convex combination of the extreme points (v(N)i, 0N\i) = (0, . . . , 0, v(N), 0, . . . , 0), i =
1, . . . , n. Moreover, let ψ1(v), . . . ,ψn(v) be n pyramidal allocations, and let S1(v), . . . ,Sn(v), be
their corresponding pyramidal sharing schemes. Then, the linear convex combination λ1S1(v) +
· · · + λnSn(v) (λi ≥ 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n, and λ1 + · · · + λn = 1) is also a pyramidal sharing
scheme, which gives the pyramidal allocation λ1ψ1(v) + · · ·+ λnψn(v).
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Now, we will prove that any extreme point (v(N)i, 0N\i) can be obtained by means of a pyra-
midal sharing scheme when negative payments are allowed. Let pi ∈ Π(N) be any given order.
Let us consider the following reallocation:
• For all player k ∈ Ppi(i), his salary is spik (v) = mpik (v), and he distributes apijk(v) = 0 among
his predecessors j ∈ Ppi(k).
• For all player k ∈ Spi(i), his salary is spik (v) = 0, and he distributes apijk(v) = 0 among all his
predecessors j ∈ Ppi(k) \ {i}, except for player i, who receives apiik(v) = mpik (v).
• When player i ∈ N arrives, his salary is spii (v) = v(Ppi(i) ∪ i), and he distributes apiji (v) =
−mpij (v) among his predecessors j ∈ Ppi(i).
Let Si(v) denotes the pyramidal sharing scheme described above. Clearly, it gives the pyramidal
allocation (v(N)i, 0N\i), and thus the result holds.
Proposition 2. Any additive and efficient value ϕ can be obtained as a P-additive pyramidal value.
Proof. Let us first recall the unanimity basis for Gn, {(N, uT)}T⊆N , where
uT(S) =
1, if T ⊆ S,0, otherwise.
We first show that the value of any unanimity game ϕ(uT) can be obtained by means of a pyra-
midal sharing procedure. Let pi ∈ Π(N) be any given order. Let us consider the following
redistribution, where tpi ∈ T is the last member of T according to the order pi.
• For all player j ∈ Ppi(tpi), his salary is spij (uT) = 0, and he distributes apiij (uT) = 0 among his
predecessors i ∈ Ppi(j).
• When the last member of T arrives, he distributes 1 as follows:
spitpi (uT) = ϕtpi (uT) + ∑
j∈Spi(tpi)
ϕj(uT), (4)
apiitpi (uT) = ϕi(uT), for all i ∈ Ppi(tpi). (5)
• For all player j ∈ Spi(tpi), his salary is spij (uT) = ϕj(uT), which is paid by tpi . That is,
apiij (uT) = 0, for all i ∈ Ppi(j) \ {tpi}, and apitpi j(uT) = −ϕj(uT).
Clearly, the proposed sharing scheme gives ϕ(uT). Now, let (N, v) ∈ Gn be a given TU game.
Then it can be expressed as (see Shapley, 1953) v = ∑T⊆N ∆(T)uT , where ∆(T) is the Harsanyi
dividend of T in (N, v), given by ∆(T) = ∑S⊆T(−1)t−sv(S), s and t being the cardinalities of S
and T, respectively. Thus, since P-additivity implies P-linearity, the P-additive sharing scheme
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S defined by
spij (v) = ∑
T⊆N
∆(T)spij (uT),
apiij (v) = ∑
T⊆N
∆(T)apiij (uT), for all i ∈ Ppi(j),
for all j ∈ N, and for all pi ∈ Π(N), recovers ϕ(v). Note that S is also P-efficient.
Note that negative shares in the proof of Proposition 1, as well as in (5), can be interpreted as
investments on human capital. With regard to (5), if the value ϕ verifies the null player property,
then apiij (uT) = 0, for all i ∈ Ppi(j), for all j ∈ Spi(tpi), and for all order pi ∈ Π(N).
In Flores, Molina and Tejada (2012) we show that the Shapley value can also be obtained as a
non-extreme pyramidal value which is based on the second-order difference operator for a pair
of players i, j ∈ N considered by Segal (2003). Formally, the second-order difference operator for
i, j ∈ N is defined as a composition of marginal contribution operators (i.e., first-order difference
operators) as follows
∆2ijv(S) = v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j})− v(S ∪ {i}) + v(S) = ∆2jiv(S), ∀ S ⊆ N \ {i, j},
and it is interpreted as a measure of complementarity of players i and j with respect to the players
in S (see Segal, 2003). To be specific, the non-trivial pyramidal sharing scheme which defines the
Shapley value is given by spij (v) = v(j), and a
pi
ij (v) = ∆
2
ij(Spi(i, j)), for all i ∈ Ppi(j), pi ∈ Π(N),
and for all (N, v) ∈ Gn. That is, the Shapley value can be obtained as a constant salary pyramidal
value in which the shares that player i receives when player j ∈ Spi(i) arrives and joins coalition
Ppi(j) depend on their complementarity with respect to the intermediate players.
In the sequel, we will consider parametric families of pyramidal values in which the entrant
player j ∈ N receives as salary his own value plus a fixed proportion of his reduced marginal
contribution, which is precisely his added value once he has been paid accordingly to his own
value v(j), i.e.
spij = v(j) + α(m
pi
j (v)− v(j)),
and the right to get part of the benefits derived from subsequent incorporations to the just formed
coalition. The remaining benefit (1− α)(mpij (v)− v(j)) is distributed among the incumbent play-
ers.
3 α-Egalitarian pyramidal values
In this section we define and analyze the family of α-egalitarian pyramidal values, which arises
when the remaining surplus (1− α)(mpij (v)− v(j)) generated with player j’s entrance is equally
allocated among the incumbents.
Definition 3. For every TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn, the egalitarian pyramidal value is the pyramidal
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value obtained by means of the following efficient sharing scheme:
(i) Entrant j’s salary: spij (v) = v(j),
(ii) Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: apiij (v) =
(mpij (v)−v(j))
|Ppi(j)| ,
for all j ∈ N, and for all order pi ∈ Π(N). Thus, the final payoff that player i ∈ N receives
according to the order pi ∈ Π(N) is given by:
eppii (v) = v(i) + ∑
j∈Spi(i)
mpij (v)− v(j)
|Ppi(j)| , i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, the egalitarian pyramidal value, which is the expected value under the former sharing
scheme when all orders are equally likely, is given by
EP i(v) = v(i) + 1n! ∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
mpij (v)− v(j)
|Ppi(j)| , i = 1, . . . , n. (6)
Proposition 3. The egalitarian pyramidal value is the egalitarian CIS value defined by Driessen and
Funaki (1991) as
CISi(v) = v(i) +
v(N)− ∑
j∈N
v(j)
n
, i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. We will check the following equalities:
∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
mpij (v)
|Ppi(j)| = (n− 1)!(v(N)− v(i)), (7)
∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
−v(j)
|Ppi(j)| = −(n− 1)! ∑j∈N
i 6=j
v(j), (8)
for all player i = 1, . . . , n. Let i ∈ N be a fixed player, and let ∅ 6= S ( N \ {i}, then v(S ∪ i)
appears in the sum
∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
mpij (v)
|Ppi(j)| (9)
as many times as orders pi ∈ Π(N) in which S∪ i members arrive in the first positions whenever i
is not the last one. That is, in ((s+ 1)!− s!)(n− s− 1)! orders, in which v(S ∪ i) should be shared
among s players. On the other hand, −v(S ∪ i) appears as many times as orders in which S ∪ i
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arrive in the first places with independence of i’s arrival. That is, in (s + 1)!(n− s− 1)!, in which
−v(S ∪ i) should be shared among s + 1 players. Thus, all those terms are cancelled in the above
sum. Then, considering the two extreme cases S = N \ {i} (in orders pi such that pi(i) < n) and
S = ∅ (i.e., pi(i) = 1), the sum (9) must be equal to
∑
pi∈Π(N)
pi(i)<n
v(N)
n− 1 + ∑
pi∈Π(N)
pi(i)=1
−v(i)
1
= (n!− (n− 1)!) v(N)
n− 1 − (n− 1)!v(i) = (n− 1)!(v(N)− v(i))
Now, in order to prove (8), let us consider the following arrangement, which shows v(j)’s
contribution to the sum
∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
−v(j)
|Ppi(j)| ,
depending on i’s and j’s arrivals.
ARRIVALS pi(j) = 2 pi(j) = 3 · · · pi(j) = n− 1 pi(j) = n
pi(i) = 1 −v(j) − v(j)2 · · · − v(j)n−2 − v(j)n−1
pi(i) = 2 − v(j)2 · · · − v(j)n−2 − v(j)n−1
. . . · · · · · ·
pi(i) = n− 2 − v(j)n−2 − v(j)n−1
pi(i) = n− 1 − v(j)n−1
TOTAL −v(j) −2 v(j)2 · · · −(n− 2) v(j)n−2 −(n− 1) v(j)n−1 −(n− 1)v(j)
Thus, taking into account that the number of orders pi ∈ Π(N) for which pi(i) = k and
pi(j) = `, with ` > k, is (n− 2)!, for all ` = k+ 1, . . . , n, and for all k = 1, . . . , n− 1, and extending
the previous reasoning to all j ∈ N \ {i}, equality (8) follows.
In the egalitarian pyramidal value all the remaining benefit mpij (v) − v(j) generated with
player j’s entrance is equally allocated among the incumbents. In the following definition, which
generalizes the previous one, we consider the case in which only a fixed proportion (1− α)(mpij (v)−
v(j)), with α ∈ [0, 1], is equally allocated among the incumbents.
Definition 4. For every TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn, and every α ∈ [0, 1], the α-egalitarian pyramidal
value is the pyramidal value obtained by means of the following efficient sharing scheme:
(i) Entrant j’s salary: spi,αj (v) = v(j) + α(m
pi
j (v)− v(j)),
(ii) Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: api,αij (v) =
(1−α)(mpij (v)−v(j))
|Ppi(j)| ,
for all j ∈ N, and for all order pi ∈ Π(N). Thus, the final payoff that player i ∈ N receives
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according to the order pi ∈ Π(N) is given by:
eppi,αi (v) = v(i) + α(m
pi
i (v)− v(i)) + (1− α) ∑
j∈Spi(i)
mpij (v)− v(j)
|Ppi(j)| , i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, the α-egalitarian pyramidal value, which is the expected value under the former shar-
ing scheme when all orders are equally likely, is given by
EPαi (v) = v(i) +
1
n! ∑
pi∈Π(N)
(
α(mpii (v)− v(i)) + (1− α) ∑
j∈Spi(i)
mpij (v)− v(j)
|Ppi(j)|
)
, i = 1, . . . , n. (10)
Corollary 1. The family of α-egalitarian pyramidal values turns out to be the family of α-consensus values
introduced by Ju, Borm and Ruys (2007).
Proof. For every TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn, and every α ∈ [0, 1], taking into account proposition 3, it
holds
EPαi (v) = αφi(v) + (1− α)EP0i (v), i = 1, . . . , n,
where φ(v) denotes the Shapley value of the game (N, v), and EP0(v), which denotes the egali-
tarian pyramidal value, equals the egalitarian CIS value. Therefore, the coincidence follows from
result (c) in Theorem 5 in Ju et al. (2007).
For every α ∈ [0, 1], the α-egalitarian pyramidal value verifies the following properties (see Ju
et al.):
(i) Standard for two-person games.
(ii) Additivity.
(iii) Symmetry.
(iv) Relative invariance with respect to strategic equivalence.
(v) α-dummy, i.e.
ϕi(v) = αv(i) + (1− α)
(
v(i) +
v(N)−∑j∈N v(j)
n
)
,
for all (N, v) ∈ Gn, and every dummy player i ∈ N with respect to v.
Observe that the family of α-egalitarian pyramidal values is the standard solution for two
person cooperative games for all α ∈ [0, 1], since the α-consensus family of values arises as a gen-
eralization of this solution to general n-person cooperative games. Note also that the family of
α-egalitarian pyramidal values fails to verify the dummy property. On the contrary, as mentioned
above, the α-pyramidal value verifies the α-dummy property introduced by Ju et al. (2007), which
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in authors’ own words, “balances the tensions between the four fundamental principles of dis-
tributive justice (cf. Moulin, 2003)”. To be specific, they first introduce the neutral dummy property,
which characterizes the consensus value (when α = 12 ). Then, extending their arguments, they
define the α-dummy property, in order to characterize the α-consensus value.
In particular, the pyramidal definition of the α-consensus values gives an alternative construc-
tive approach to the standardized remainder vectors that determine the α-consensus values, which
provides solid ground for it in terms of the dynamics of economic activity.
Example 1. Let us illustrate the pyramidal sharing scheme which gives rise to the consensus
value by means of the same example as in Ju et al. (2007). Consider the following 3-person game
(N, v):
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(S) 10 0 0 18 23 0 30
The pyramidal egalitarian shares for α = 12 , which is the consensus value, are depicted in the
following table:
Players’ shares at each player’s arrival
Marginal contributions First arrival Second arrival Third arrival
Order mpi1 (v) m
pi
2 (v) m
pi
3 (v) s
pi
1 (v) s
pi
2 (v) s
pi
3 (v) s
pi
1 (v) s
pi
2 (v) s
pi
3 (v) s
pi
1 (v) s
pi
2 (v) s
pi
3 (v)
1
2 -ep
pi
1 (v)
1
2 -ep
pi
2 (v)
1
2 -ep
pi
3 (v)
api1j (v) a
pi
2j (v) a
pi
3j (v) a
pi
1j (v) a
pi
2j (v) a
pi
3j (v)
(123) 10 8 12 10 4 4 3 3 6 17 7 6
(132) 10 7 13 10 6.5 6.5 1.75 3.5 1.75 18.25 3.5 8.25
(213) 18 0 12 0 14 4 3 3 6 17 7 6
(231) 30 0 0 0 0 0 20 5 5 20 5 5
(312) 23 7 0 0 16.5 6.5 1.75 3.5 1.75 18.25 3.5 8.25
(321) 30 0 0 0 0 0 20 5 5 20 5 5
Shapley 20 16 3
2
3 6
1
6 Consensus value 18
5
12 5
1
6 6
5
12
Table 1: 12 -egalitarian pyramidal Shares. Example 1
Note that the constructive approach given by the pyramidal sharing of the current benefits is
more simple than the two recursions considered in Ju et al. (2007), and it also allows us to observe
more clearly the allocation of the global final benefit, v(N), in terms of the dynamics of economic
activity.
Joosten (1996) introduces the family of α-egalitarian Shapley values, which is closely related
with the family of α-consensus values. In this case, the α-egalitarian Shapley family is made by
considering all convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution, which
distributes the worth of the grand coalition equally among all players. Here, in view of Proposi-
tion 3, we can establish a pyramidal construction for the egalitarian Shapley values, in which the
entrant retains a fixed fraction α of his marginal contribution, and distributes the remaining part
equally among his predecessors. Formally,
Corollary 2. For every TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn, and every α ∈ [0, 1], its α-egalitarian Shapley value
φα(v), defined by Joosten (1996) as
φαi (v) = αφi(v) + (1− α)
v(N)
n
, for all i = 1, . . . , n,
equals the pyramidal value obtained by means of the following P-efficient sharing scheme:
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(i) Entrant j’s salary: spij (v) = αm
pi
j (v), if pi(j) > 1; and s
pi
j (v) = m
pi
j (v), whenever pi(j) = 1.
(ii) Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: apiij (v) =
(1−α)mpij (v)
|Ppi(j)| .
4 α-Proportional pyramidal values for monotonic games
In the α-egalitarian family, the remaining surplus, which represents the value that entrant j’s
participation adds to the incumbents, is shared equally among all the incumbents. In this section
we consider a non egalitarian framework, in which a player’s right to get part of the forthcoming
benefits is determined according to his initial investment. We measure this initial investment as
the value his incorporation have added to the incumbents, or in other words, by means of his
marginal contribution, and define the family of α-proportional values. As the α-egalitarian family,
the α-proportional one is also symmetric. At the end of this section, we adopt a very general point
of view, and we consider non-symmetric ways of allocating the added value by means of a given
collection of weighting vectors which is exogenously given: the family of α-ω-weighted pyramidal
values.
Taking into account that a proportional allocation with respect to a given weight system in
which some of the weights can be strictly negative must be carefully used, we restrict the defini-
tion of α-proportional pyramidal values to the subclass of monotonic TU games (i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T),
for all S ⊆ T). In that case, all marginal contributions mpij (v), j ∈ N, pi ∈ Π(N) are non negative.
Definition 5. For every monotonic TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn, and every α ∈ [0, 1], the α-proportional
pyramidal value is the pyramidal obtained by means of the following efficient sharing scheme:
(i) Entrant j’s salary:
spi,αj (v) =
mpij (v), if v(Ppi(j)) = 0,v(j) + α(mpij (v)− v(j)), otherwise.
(ii) Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares:
api,αij (v) =
0, if v(Ppi(j)) = 0,(1− α) mpii (v)v(Ppi(j)) (mpij (v)− v(j)), otherwise.
for all j ∈ N, and for all order pi ∈ Π(N). Thus, the final payoff that player i ∈ N receives
according to the order pi ∈ Π(N) is given by:
pppi,αi (v) = v(i) + α(m
pi
i (v)− v(i)) + (1− α) ∑
j∈Spi(i)
v(Ppi(j)) 6=0
mpii (v)
v(Ppi(j))
(mpij (v)− v(j)), (11)
11
if v(Ppi(i)) 6= 0, and
pppi,αi (v) = m
pi
i (v) + (1− α) ∑
j∈Spi(i)
v(Ppi(j)) 6=0
mpii (v)
v(Ppi(j))
(mpij (v)− v(j)), (12)
if v(Ppi(i)) = 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, the α-proportional pyramidal value, which is the
expected value under the former sharing scheme when all orders are equally likely, is given by
PPαi (v) =
1
n!
(
∑
pi∈Π(N)
v(Ppi(i)) 6=0
(
v(i) + α(mpii (v)− v(i))
)
+ ∑
pi∈Π(N)
v(Ppi(i))=0
mpii (v)
)
+
1− α
n!
(
∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
v(Ppi(j)) 6=0
mpii (v)
v(Ppi(j))
(mpij (v)− v(j))
)
, i = 1, . . . , n. (13)
Proposition 4. For every monotonic TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn, and every α ∈ [0, 1], it holds
PPα(v) = αφ(v) + (1− α)PP0(v).
Proof. Trivially, if we express v(i) and mpii (v) as αv(i) + (1− α)v(i) and αmpii (v) + (1− α)mpii (v)
in the first summand of (13), it follows that every α-proportional pyramidal value is the linear
convex combination of the two extreme values for α = 0 and α = 1. Moreover, since the 1-
proportional pyramidal value is in fact the Shapley value, then the result holds.
Let us analyze, by means of two examples, the behavior of the extreme zero-proportional value
and the α’s choice effect over the final allocation of benefits. We will also look at their relation with
the core of the game. Recall that the core of the game (N, v) ∈ Gn is the set
C(v) :=
{
x ∈ Rn | ∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S), for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and ∑
i∈N
xi = v(N)
}
.
If x ∈ C(v), the coalition S 6= N has an incentive to split off if x is the proposed reward allocation
in N.
Example 2. Let us consider previous example 1. In the following graphs are represented the
families of α-egalitarian and α-proportional pyramidal values, respectively.
12
05
10
15
20
25
30
0 0,5 1 1,5
E P
α
α
α‐Egalitarian Pyramidal values
Player 1
Player 2
Player 3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 1,2
P P
α
α
α−Proportional Pyramidal values
Player 1
Player 2
Player 3
The core of the game is non-empty and both families lie in the core, which is given by:
C(v) =
{
(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3 | x1 ≥ 11, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 7, 0 ≤ x3 ≤ 18,
3
∑
i=1
xi = 30
}
In the following picture, the egalitarian family is drawn in green color, and the proportional fam-
ily in blue.
(30,0,0) (23,7,0)
(11,7,12)
	
=18
(0,30,0)
(0,0,30)
(11,1,18)(12,0,18)
C(v)= (	, 	, 	
) ∈ ℝ
|	 ≥ 11, 	 ≤ 7, 	
 ≤ 18,∑ 	
 = 30
It should be noted that proportional values reward a player for his contribution to the estab-
lishment of the firm as well as for his contribution to the firm’s growth. The parameter α controls
to what extent a player must be compensated according to his participation at the beginning of
the project rather than to his contribution to its evolution. This kind of establishment compensa-
tion, which in this particular example benefits player 1, shows an extreme effect in the next one,
where a non-null dummy agent receives a compensation larger than his marginal contribution.
Example 3. Consider the following 3-person game (N, v):
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(S) 1 0 0 1 1 10 11
The families of α-egalitarian and α-proportional pyramidal values are given by:
EPα(v) = α(1, 5, 5) + (1− α)(41
3
, 3
1
3
, 3
1
3
)
PPα(v) = α(1, 5, 5) + (1− α)(72
3
, 1
2
3
, 1
2
3
)
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Note that in general the proportional family fails to verify the dummy property. However, it
satisfies the weaker property of null player, i.e. PPαi (v) = 0 for all (N, v) ∈ Gn and for all null
player i ∈ N.
In this example, the core of the game is also non empty, and the Shapley value belongs to the
core. However, it is the unique value of both families which is stable, i.e., which belongs to the
core. In this example, the core:
C(v) =
{
(1, x2, x3) ∈ R3 | x2 + x3 = 10 and x2, x3 ≥ 0
}
,
has an empty relative interior.2 Otherwise, if the relative interior of the core is non-empty and the
Shapley value is stable and lies in the core’s relative interior, then there exist αe and αp in [0, 1)
such that EPα(v) ∈ C(v), for all α ≥ αe, and PPα(v) ∈ C(v), for all α ≥ αp.
In general, the proportional pyramidal values are not additive. For every α ∈ [0, 1], the α-
proportional pyramidal value verifies the following properties:
(i) Standard for two-person games.
(ii) Symmetry.
(iii) Null player.
(iv) Null player out, defined in (Derks and Haller, 1999) as:
PPαj (N, v) = PPαj (N \ {i}, v|N\{i}), for all j 6= i ∈ N,
for all (N, v) ∈ Gn such that i is a null player in v.
The property of standard for two-person games follows because for two-person games all
choices of α ∈ [0, 1] give raise to the same value, the Shapley value. The same occurs when
we restrict ourselves to the class of monotonic simple games: (N, u) ∈ Gn monotonic such that
u(S) ∈ {0, 1}, for all S ⊆ N.
Proposition 5. Let (N, u) ∈ Gn be a monotonic simple game. Then PPα(u) = φ(u), for all α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Let (N, u) ∈ Gn be a monotonic simple game, and let be pi ∈ Π(N) be a given order. Since
there exists a unique ipi ∈ N with nonzero marginal contribution, then spiipi (u) = mpiipi (u) = 1,
apiiipi (u) = 0, and m
pi
j (u) = m
pi
j (u)− u(j) = 0, for all j 6= ipi .
The two families of pyramidal values we have considered can be considered as special sub-
classes of the general class of α-ω-weighted pyramidal values defined as follows.
Definition 6. For every TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn, and every α ∈ [0, 1]. Letω = {(ωpi1 , . . . ,ωpin )}pi∈Π(N)
be a given collection of weighting vectors exogenously given, with ωpij ≥ 0, for all j ∈ N, and for
all pi ∈ Π(N). Then, the α-ω-weighted pyramidal value is the pyramidal obtained by means of the
following efficient sharing scheme:
2Which is defined as the interior of the core as a subset of the subspace of efficient allocations.
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(i) Entrant j’s salary: spi,α,ωj (v) = v(j) + α(m
pi
j (v)− v(j)),
(ii) Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: api,α,ωij (v) = (1− α)
ωpii
∑k∈Ppi (j) ω
pi
k
(mpij (v)− v(j))
for all j ∈ N, and for all order pi ∈ Π(N). Thus, the final payoff that player i ∈ N receives
according to the order pi ∈ Π(N) is given by:
wppi,α,ωi (v) = v(i) + α(m
pi
i (v)− v(i)) + (1− α) ∑
j∈Spi(i)
ωpii
∑
k∈Ppi(j)
ωpik
(mpij (v)− v(j)), i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, the α-ω-weighted pyramidal value, which is the expected value under the former shar-
ing scheme when all orders are equally likely, is given by
WPα,ωi (v) = v(i)+
1
n! ∑
pi∈Π(N)
(
α(mpii (v)− v(i))+ (1− α) ∑
j∈Spi(i)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
ωpii
∑
k∈Ppi(j)
ωpik
(mpij (v)− v(j))
)
,
(14)
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
In general, the unique property that is satisfied by every α-ω-weighted pyramidal value is
efficiency. It should be pointed out that the previous definition must be adapted in order to take
into account that the sum ∑k∈Ppi(j) ω
pi
k can be equal zero. In that case, the entrant j would receive
the whole of his marginal contribution.
5 Conclusions and future research
In this paper we have proposed a general procedure for obtaining a broad class of solution con-
cepts based on a pyramidal distribution of the benefits that are sequentially obtained through a
dynamic process of coalition formation, in which players successively come into play and join the
current coalition until the grand coalition is formed. To be specific, we have analyzed in detail
two parametric families of pyramidal values: the α-egalitarian and the α-proportional pyramidal
families, which contain the Shapley value as an extreme case. Since the α-egalitarian values co-
incide with the α-consensus values (Ju et al., 2007), all of them are axiomatically characterized.
Axiomatic characterizations for the proportional family, as well as a strategic analysis of this kind
of solutions, are left for future research.
It must be pointed out that the complexity of the calculus of a pyramidal value relies cru-
cially on the calculus of the pyramidal sharing scheme and, obviously, on the complexity of the
characteristic function of the game. In the case of the two proposed families, if the marginal
contributions can be calculated (or at least approximated) in polynomial time, then any pyrami-
dal value can also be estimated in polynomial time. In fact, following Castro, Gomez and Tejada
(2009), any value that can be expressed as an expectation of a polynomial function of the marginal
contribution vectors over all permutations, when all orderings are equally likely, can be estimated
in polynomial time, whenever the marginal contributions are computable in polinomial time.
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